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Since its emergence in 1969, the Uniform Probate Code'
(UPC) has attracted considerable attention. Scholars have
offered extensive commentary,2 and legislatures in fourteen
states have adopted it.3 For a variety of reasons, however, thirty-
seven other jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia)
have not adopted the statute. This Article examines how the
UPC has influenced the law and its practice in those places. A
survey" of statutes and cases suggests that the UPC is a viable
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Kathleen F. Bornhorst and to Jay Withrow who, as law students at the University of
Toledo and the University of Richmond, respectively, provided able research assistance.
1. UNIv. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Emery, The Utah Uniform Probate Code-Protection of the Surviving
Spouse-The Elective Share, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 771; Ingram & Rudolph-Boevers, The
Uniform Probate Code and the Federal Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 1976 UTAH L.
REV. 819; Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.O.D. Bank Accounts: Virginia Law Com-
pared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 41 (1973); Kurtz, The Aug-
mented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable
Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977); Lilly, The Uniform Probate Code and
Oklahoma Law: A Comparison (pts. 1 & 2), 8 TULSA L.J. 159 (1972), 9 TULSA L.J. 1
(1973); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN.
L. REV. 453 (1970); Comment, Surviving Spouses-Uniform Probate Code Versus Penn-
sylvania's Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 576 (1973).
3. The states are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. UNIF. PROB.
CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983).
4. A word on methodology may be useful. The statutory survey encompassed the
statutes of every state that is not listed in Uniform Laws Annotated as having adopted
virtually all of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). When a statute based on the UPC was
identified, it was classified as belonging in one of four categories: (1) same as UPC; (2)
same as UPC except for small changes (e.g., use of "conservator" instead of "guardian");
(3) similar to UPC (much of the thrust of UPC retained, but with significant word
changes); or (4) derived from the UPC (if legislative history indicates derivation).
Because the totals in each category proved so small, all categories have been combined
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but underutilized source of law reform and legal argument.
In twenty-three states, legislative unwillingness to embrace
the UPC as a whole has not precluded adoption of some of its
provisions. As the first part of this Article indicates, the most
common pattern is for a state to use the Code as a model to
solve an isolated, but common, problem. Article II of the UPC,
which covers intestacy and wills, is by far the most often copied
article; the most often followed sections are those dealing with
traditional troublespots, such as the effects of survival, adoption,
and divorce.' In contrast, among those UPC sections garnering
the least attention are those proposing controversial reforms,
such as the installation of a system for informal probate.' Many
jurisdictions that have rejected the Code nonetheless have bene-
fited from its use as a model for solving particular problems.
The UPC has also been useful to courts seeking solutions to
common-law and statutory construction problems. Part III of
this Article suggests that judicial willingness to follow the UPC
position on a particular point parallels the legislative pattern of
for the purpose of discussion in the text and display in the tables. Generally these stat-
utes are referred to in the text as "based on" the UPC, without further elaboration.
Despite careful examination, the breadth and complexity of the project make it pos-
sible that some statutes based on the UPC have not been identified. An isolated provi-
sion placed in an odd part of a particular state's code may have been missed. A statute
may have been "drawn from" the UPC, but without language sufficiently similar to show
the connection. See In re Jones, 379 Mass. 826, 833 n.10, 401 N.E.2d 351, 356-57 n.10
(1980). A legislature may have compared the UPC to its statute and concluded that both
accomplished the same thing. See Green v. Potter, 51 N.Y.2d 627, 416 N.E.2d 1030, 435
N.Y.S.2d 695, (1980). A statute may be "twice removed" from the UPC, based on one
state's statute that was, in turn, based on the UPC; by the time two legislatures had
reworded the provision, it may not have been sufficiently like the UPC to be recogniza-
ble. To the extent that error exists in the statutory survey, the survey understates the
impact of the UPC.
The use of full-text computerized searches of reported opinions means that virtually
all cases citing the UPC should have been identified. Even here, however, the possibility
for understatement exists: a court may have been influenced by the UPC, yet not have
cited it.
Finally, of course, the study is subject to later developments. The statutory survey
was conducted primarily during the summer of 1983; the case survey during late 1983
and early 1984. References to Washington law are current to late 1984. Despite the possi-
bility that a particular statute or case may have been missed, the survey should be valua-
ble as an indicator of trends.
5. See supra note 4. Because the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
was widely adopted before the UPC incorporated its provisions as § 2-511, states that
have adopted only the UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITION TO TRUSTS AcT, 8A U.L.A. 599
(1983), are not included in the category of "swing" states that adopted some UPC provi-
sions. See also infra note 11.
6. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Table II pp. 606-07.
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applying the UPC to common troublespots. In addition, this
part of the Article discusses the ways advocates have used the
UPC both as respected secondary authority and as an aid to the
interpretation of particular state statutes. The Code's potential
as a source of authority is now established but largely untapped.
Because many readers of this journal have a particular
interest in Washington law, part IV of this Article briefly applies
to Washington the lessons of this Article's first parts. Some
areas ripe for legislative reform are identified, and examples are
given illustrating how Washington advocates might tap the UPC
as a source of argument.
II. PIECEMEAL STATUTORY REFORM
The primary purpose of the UPC is to serve as a device for
achieving statutory reform. One measure of the strength of the
Code is the extent to which "swing" states, those that have
adopted some UPC sections, have used it as a model for their
own statutes. This part of the Article examines the extent to
which the swing states have followed the Code. With the excep-
tion of the Rocky Mountain states, where six of seven have
adopted the UPC, there is no particular geographic pattern to
those states that have adopted some UPC provisions or to those
that have not adopted any. Vermont, Georgia, Texas, and Iowa
have each followed the UPC on some occasions." On the other
hand, no direct evidence was found in Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Oklahoma, or Wisconsin that the UPC has been used as a
source of statutes. Local, rather than regional, considerations
appear to have affected the extent to which the UPC has been a
model.
Support for the UPC, as measured by the presence of stat-
utes that track it, varies among the swing states. However, all
except New Jersey"0 have used it as a model to solve particular
problems, rather than as a means to accomplish more wide-rang-
ing reform. These jurisdictions are in effect saying, "We'll follow
8. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, and Utah have adopted the
Code; only Wyoming has not, although it has adopted some provisions. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-1101 to -7307 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1973); IDAHO
CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -7-307 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to -5-502 (1980); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to -7-401 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -8-101 (1978).
9. See infra Tables I & II pp. 604-07.
10. New Jersey has adopted substantial parts of several UPC articles. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3B:10-23 to -30, :23-7 to -10, :14-25 to -28 (West 1983).
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the UPC's view on advancements of an intestate share," instead
of, "We like the UPC's approach to intestacy." Those sections of
the Code with the greatest following address topics that have
traditionally posed serious problems for courts. In addition, the
UPC's more controversial proposals have largely fallen flat in
swing states.
A look at UPC article II, excluding section 2-511," reveals
some interesting patterns. Article II has broad but thin appeal;
virtually every section has been followed in a few states, but no
section has attracted the support of more than six states. Table I
identifies those article II provisions that have been followed
most often in the swing states. Article II has been used most
consistently as a source of solutions to common troublespots. A
list of the most popular topics reads like a litany of traditional
problems in intestate succession and wills: survival, adoption,
nonmarital children, advancements, and the effect of divorce.
The UPC's approach to these subjects has been followed by at
least four states.12
Somewhat surprisingly, states that follow the UPC in one
area do not necessarily follow it in a related one. 13 For example,
six swing states have provisions patterned on the section 2-104
rule that an intestate heir must survive the decedent by 120
hours in order to take.14 Only three of those states, however,
adopted the parallel provision for wills. 1' Similarly, six states
follow the section 2-110 approach and require a writing in order
to establish that a gift is to be treated as an advancement of the
donee's intestate share. 6 Only three of these states follow paral-
lel section 2-612, which requires a writing to establish that an
inter vivos gift was meant to be in satisfaction of a gift by will.17
11. Section 2-511 of the UPC is § 1 of the Uniform Testamentary Addition to
Trusts Act. See UNIP. PROB. CODE § 2-511 comment, 8 U.L.A. 126 (1983). Because the
older act was widely adopted prior to promulgation of the UPC, states that have adopted
only the older act are not included in the category of swing states. See supra note 5. For
a list of states that have adopted UPC § 2-511, see UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS
TO TRUSTS AcT, 8A U.L.A. 599 (1983).





17. Perhaps a difference in substance between the sections contributed to the result
noted. Under UPC § 2-110, the issue of a predeceased heir who received an advancement
are not "burdened" by it when the shares of the issue are calculated. On the other hand,
the issue of a predeceased beneficiary whose gift has been adeemed by satisfaction will
[Vol. 8:599
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Although a variety of possible explanations for the failure to
pair related sections can be advanced, these results suggest that
legislators examining the UPC as a model to solve particular
problems might benefit from a general perusal of the statute,
looking for related topics.
Table II demonstrates that support for sections outside of
article II has been considerably more spotty; only rarely have
more than two jurisdictions adopted any particular provision.
Two short articles have received some attention: article IV on
ancillary administration and article VI on multiple-party and
payable-on-death accounts have each been substantially fol-
lowed in four states. Again, what limited use has been made of
the UPC as a model statute has been to solve traditional
problems.
A statutory review also reveals some interesting gaps. In
areas in which the UPC has proposed substantial reforms, it has
not gained adherents in the swing states. Article III's stream-
lined approach to probate administration was expected to raise
substantial opposition.1 8 Only about one-third of article III's 150
sections have been adopted in any of the states; no section has
been adopted in more than three states.' 9 Furthermore, only
twelve of the twenty-three swing states have adopted any of arti-
cle 111.20 The UPC's article III, part 3, proposals for informal
probate and succession without administration have gone with-
out a single swing state supporter. Only three states have looked
to the article for solutions to a set of administrative problems,
rather than for an isolated section.2
be "burdened" if the issue take under the anti-lapse statute. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-
110, -605, -612 comment, 8 U.L.A. 69, 144, 153 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Crapo, The Uniform Probate Code-It Still Works in Idaho, 1979
B.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 359-60; Wellman & Gordon, The Uniform Probate Code: Article III
Analyzed in Relation to Changes in the First Nine Enactments, 1976 ARIz. ST. L.J. 477,
478-85; Comment, Articles II and III of the Uniform Probate Code as Enacted in Utah,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 445-54.
19. See supra note 4; infra note 20.
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-76 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2203.1 (Supp. 1983);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 395.195 (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.793 (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-19 (West 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-1 (Supp. 1984); OR. REV.
STAT. § 114.225 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3376 (Purdon 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 29-2-5 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1051 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 64.1-
132.2, -132.3 (Supp. 1984); WvO. STAT. § 2-7-705 (1980).
21. New Jersey has adopted many of the provisions on powers and duties of the
personal representative, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:10-19 to -23, :10-27 to -32, :14-35 to -37
(West 1983), some of the provisions on creditors' claims, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:22-1, -2,
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Support for article VII's proposals on trust administration has
been even lower; only Kentucky22 has enacted more than one
section. Similarly, only Oregon has adopted more than one of
the guardianship proposals in article V.23 The same lack of sup-
port is evident for the UPC's proposal allowing a surviving
spouse to elect against a will and take a share of an "augmented
estate." '24 Only two of the twenty-three swing states have fol-
lowed the UPC's lead on this question.25 Perhaps the movement
for more equal treatment of spouses has stalled, or perhaps the
problem of disinheritance is more theoretical than real.26 In any
event, the augmented estate is another reform that has not
spread beyond the states that have adopted the UPC. The pat-
tern of nonsupport for controversial reforms suggests that these
proposals will seldom be adopted piecemeal. They have been
accepted only when buttressed by the argument that controver-
sial reforms should be accepted because the statute should be
taken as a whole.
As a model statute, the UPC has been helpful to jurisdic-
tions that have chosen not to adopt the whole. The Code offers
sensible solutions to traditional problems; gaps of one sort or
another can be filled in local statutes. While thorough or contro-
versial reform of one area of the law of wills might be achieved
-19 to -21, :23-42, :14-31 to -34 (West 1983), and most of the provisions dealing with
practical problems of distribution of estates, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:22-19 to -21, :23-1 to -
15, :23-42 to -43 (West 1983). Vermont has followed the UPC regarding creditors' claims,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1202-1212, 1214-1216 (Supp. 1984). Missouri has adopted a few
of the models regarding inventory of an estate, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 473.793, .797(1), .800
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
22. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 386.655-.735 (1984).
23. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.060-.100, .267, .273, .297, .337-.353, .413 (1981).
Article V's provisions came later than those of most of the rest of the Code, originally
approved in 1969. Part 5 of art. V was amended in 1979 to incorporate the Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act. Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 were amended in 1982 to incorporate
the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. See 8 U.L.A. 2-3 (1983).
24. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -203, 8 U.L.A. 74-82 (1983). For a comprehen-
sive analysis, see Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate
Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-2 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-5A-1 (Supp.
1984).
26. See, e.g., Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 681, 715 (1966) ("The married testator on the whole shows
little inclination to avenge himself at death for the slights and frictions of marital
bliss."); Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Juris-
diction, 50 WASH. L. REV. 277, 316-17 (1975) ("There was virtually no indication that
spouses of either sex used dispositive instruments to deprive the surviving spouse of the
property the couple had accumulated during the marriage.").
[Vol. 8:599
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without adopting the entire statute, the pattern followed so far
suggests that such a result is unlikely. However, persons seeking
a statutory solution should carefully examine the Code's solution
to their problem and recognize that twenty-three other jurisdic-
tions have found it useful to follow the UPC in some
circumstances.
III. THE UPC IN THE COURTS
Another measure of the influence of the UPC is the nature
of its use by courts. A review2 7 of more than fifty cases from
non-UPC jurisdictions suggests UPC sections that legislators
ought to consider and demonstrates how advocates might effec-
tively use the Code. While measuring the "popularity" of a UPC
section by the number of times it is cited is a risky business, 28
some conclusions can be drawn from the willingness of different
courts to consult the same UPC sections. In addition, this part
of the Article analyzes the two primary ways in which advocates
have used the UPC: as secondary authority in a manner similar
to the restatements and as an aid to interpreting legislative his-
tory in jurisdictions that have considered specific UPC
provisions.
A. Statutory Reform Revisited
Persons interested in statutory reform can look to judicial
decisions for guidance regarding which areas need reform and
what shape the reforms might take. Judicial decisions citing the
UPC are instructive on both grounds. Judicial opinions can illus-
trate that clearer or more complete legislation on a particular
point might have obviated the need for litigation. Furthermore,
judicial adoption of a UPC approach should carry weight with a
legislature that is considering options. Despite the small number
of relevant cases, some UPC sections stand out as having
attracted judicial attention and, thus, deserving of legislative
attention as well.
UPC section 2-508 addresses the effect of divorce on the will
27. See supra note 4 for an explanation of research methods used for this Article.
28. Whether a court has occasion to cite the UPC is determined by a wide variety of
factors: which controversies are litigated and which of those are appealed, whether law-
yers for any party think to use the UPC, and whether a court in a non-UPC state is
persuaded that a citation is relevant.
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of a divorced party.29 The clarity and completeness of its cover-
age have commended it to several legislatures in non-UPC
states.30 In addition, several courts have expressed their satisfac-
tion with the Code's solution to a set of traditionally vexing
problems. As early as 1970, in First Church of Christ, Scientist
v. Watson,3' the Alabama Supreme Court utilized the then-new
UPC to support the court's interpretation of Alabama's statute.
In First Church, the testator had given all of his property to his
wife, provided she survived him by thirty days, and if not, to the
plaintiff. The couple divorced and the wife survived. The statute
then in force treated the provision for the wife as revoked.
Unanswered was whether the plaintiff could take, since the pre-
condition to taking (nonsurvival by the wife) had not been met.
The court quoted from and followed UPC section 2-508, under
which property that would have passed to the former spouse
passes as if the former spouse had not survived the decedent.3"
Other courts have followed the same path.33 Perhaps in recogni-
tion that similar litigation could be avoided, Alabama eventually
adopted section 2-508.1"
29. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-508, 8 U.L.A. 122 (1983) provides:
If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage annulled,
the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment of property
made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a general or
special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any nomination of the
former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator, or guardian, unless the will
expressly provides otherwise. Property prevented from passing to a former
spouse because of revocation by divorce or annulment passes as if the former
spouse failed to survive the decedent, and other provisions conferring some
power or office on the former spouse are interpreted as if the spouse failed to
survive the decedent. If provisions are revoked solely by this section, they are
revived by testator's remarriage to the former spouse. For purposes of this sec-
tion, divorce or annulment means any divorce or annulment which would
exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section 2-
802(b) [defining the effect of a divorce, annulment, or decree of separation). A
decree of separation which does not terminate the status of husband and wife
is not a divorce for purposes of this section. No change of circumstances other
than as described in this section revokes a will.
30. See supra Table I pp. 604-05.
31. 286 Ala. 270, 239 So. 2d 194 (1970).
32. Id. at 273, 239 So. 2d at 196 ("While our statute does not contain all of the
provisions of § 2-508 of the Uniform Probate Code, we think that property which is
prevented from passing to the former spouse because of revocation by divorce should
pass as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent .... ").
33. See Steele v. Chase, 151 Ind. App. 600, 605, 281 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1972); Russell
v. Estate of Russell, 216 Kan. 730, 733, 534 P.2d 261, 264-65 (1975); Calloway v. Estate of
Gasser, 558 S.W.2d 571, 575-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
34. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-137 (1982).
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The comprehensiveness of UPC section 2-508 also came to
the aid of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. In Smith v. Smith,3
the testator had left all of his property to his wife; later, the
couple divorced and then remarried each other. The Texas stat-
ute followed the usual approach of revoking provisions in favor
of a divorced spouse but made no mention of the effect of
remarriage. Under section 2-508, will provisions revoked by the
section at divorce are revived by remarriage.3 6 Following the
UPC approach, the court called the UPC drafters "distinguished
legal scholars" and concluded that "their determination of
sound legislative policy confirms our conclusion that the con-
struction we have given [the Texas statute] is in accordance with
the legislative intent.
37
Courts have also looked to the UPC for guidance in solving
the oft-litigated problems of joint and survivorship bank
accounts. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a dispute between the
surviving husband (and joint depositor) and the estate of his
wife, 38 went so far as to "adopt" 39 sections 6-103(a) and 6-104(a),
which establish presumptions about the ownership of such
accounts. Furthermore, an appellate court in Texas cited section
6-104(a) as authority for its decision to admit parol evidence to
show that the express terms of a bank account did not reflect
the depositor's intention.4 ° In another dispute over the effect of
joint ownership, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
cited with approval the Code's policy of recognizing will substi-
tutes despite their noncompliance with the statute of wills. "1
Again, judicial willingness to follow the UPC's lead on tradition-
ally troublesome questions should suggest to legislatures that
they might save the courts trouble by adopting the provisions
themselves.
One might not expect courts to look to a model statute for
35. 519 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
36. See supra note 29.
37. Smith, 519 S.W.2d at 155.
38. Estate of Thompson v. Botts, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 371, 423 N.E.2d 90 (1981).
39. Id. at 374-75, 423 N.E.2d at 94 ("We hold that the presumptions created in
these two sections accurately reflect the common experiences of mankind in regard to
joint and survivorship accounts. As a result, we adopt these specific sections as the law of
this state.").
40. Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
41. Blanchette v. Blanchette, 362 Mass. 518, 526, 287 N.E.2d 459, 464 (1972) (quot-
ing the comment to UPC § 6-201 to the effect that "the evils envisioned if the statute of
wills is not rigidly enforced simply do not materialize").
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answers to procedural questions, about which there is often a
local bias. However, courts in four jurisdictions have cited with
approval the UPC's approach to handling creditors' claims. 4
2
The approach of an Illinois appellate court is particularly inter-
esting.43 In a style similar to the Ohio Supreme Court's "adop-
tion" of joint bank account provisions,4 4 the Illinois court virtu-
ally read the UPC definition of "claims" into the Illinois
statute.45 States not willing to adopt the UPC's thorough proce-
dural reforms might nonetheless benefit from following the UPC
on narrower questions, such as how to handle creditors' claims.
At least in these three areas-effect of divorce, joint
accounts, and creditors' claims-several courts have been willing
to follow and even expressly "adopt" the UPC approach, despite
the absence of legislative action.46 This judicial activism suggests
that these areas are appropriate places on which to focus piece-
meal statutory reform.
B. A Source for Advocates
1. The UPC as Secondary Authority
As earlier discussion has demonstrated, the UPC has often
42. Taylor v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 325
N.E.2d 444, 446 (1975) (citing UPC § 1-201(4) in holding: "'The term [claims] does not
include . . . disputes regarding title of a decedent . . . to specific assets alleged to be
included in the estate.' "); Lunderville v. Morse, 112 N.H. 6, 9, 287 A.2d 612, 614 (1972)
(citing UPC §§ 3-801 to -804 in suit by creditor against executors; executor of creditor's
estate had informed executor of debtor's estate that creditor's niece held an unsigned
note of debtor; this action supplied sufficient notice to comply with nonclaim statute);
Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 116, 492 P.2d 219, 222 (1971)
(citing UPC § 3-803, which subjects estates protected by insurance to a potentially
longer period of liability); Kornitz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 322,
332 n.8, 260 N.W.2d 680, 685 n.8 (1978) (citing UPC §§ 3.803(c)(1), -812, -814, to sub-
stantiate the statement that "[a] secured creditor retains his rights in any security in
spite of failure to file").
43. See Taylor v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 610, 325
N.E.2d 444 (1975).
44. See supra text accompanying note 38.
45. The court quoted UPC § 1-201(4) and then concluded: "Therefore petitioner's
instant action is not a claim and is not subject to the limitations of [the Illinois statute]."
Taylor v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 325 N.E.2d
444, 446 (1975).
46. See also Gedlen v. Safran, 102 Wis. 2d 79, 89-90, 306 N.W.2d 27, 32 (1981), and
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524, 532 (E.D. La. 1981),
which followed the approach of UPC § 2-803 regarding the right of someone who might
benefit from committing a homicide. But see State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver, 275
S.E.2d 10, 12 (W. Va. 1981) (citing UPC § 2-803, but leaving adoption of the rule to the
legislature).
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been cited as secondary authority for the position taken by a
particular court. At this level, the Code has been well received.
Of thirty-eight cases citing the UPC in a context unrelated to
the analysis of the legislative history of a local statute, only four
rejected the position proposed by the Code.47 This part of the
Article examines how advocates have used the Code in various
situations.
One clear lesson from the cases is that lawyers can use the
UPC effectively, much as they might use a treatise or restate-
47. The following UPC sections have been cited with approval: UPC § 1-201(4) as
cited in Taylor v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 325
N.E.2d 444, 446 (1975). UPC § 1-201(20) as cited in Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 206 n.2,
223 S.E.2d 445, 451 n.2 (1976). UPC § 1-401(a)(3) as cited in Oakley v. Anderson, 235
Ga. 607, 610, 221 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1975). UPC § 2-107 as cited in Warpool v. Floyd, 524
S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tenn. 1975). UPC § 2-109 as cited in Thom v. Bailey, 257 Or. 572, 600
n.38, 481 P.2d 355, 368 n.38 (1971). UPC § 2-205 as cited in Love v. Pogue, 650 S.W.2d
346, 360 (Mo. 1983). UPC § 2-503 as cited in Heckel v. Gilfillan, 60 Cal. App. 3d 975, 981
n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 n.2 (1976). UPC § 2-505 as cited in Rogers v. Helmes, 23
Ohio Op. 3d 301, 305 n.10, 432 N.E.2d 186, 190 n.10 (1982). UPC § 2-508 as cited in First
Church of Christ, Scientist v. Watson, 286 Ala. 270, 273, 239 So. 2d 194, 196 (1970);
Steele v. Chase, 151 Ind. App. 600, 605, 281 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1972); Russell v. Estate of
Russell, 216 Kan. 730, 733, 534 P.2d 261, 264 (1975); Calloway v. Estate of Gasser, 558
S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Smith v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974). UPC § 2-606(b) as cited in In re Estate of Leavy, 122 N.H. 184, 185-86, 442
A.2d 588, 589 (1982); In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H. 320, 326, 295 A.2d 448, 452 (1972).
UPC § 2-608 as cited in Graham v. Home State Bank, 216 Kan. 770, 775, 533 P.2d 1318,
1322 (1975). UPC § 2-610 as cited in Leidy Chem. Found., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 276
Md. 689, 697, 351 A.2d 129, 133 (1976). UPC § 2-801 as cited in In re Estate of Mixter,
83 Misc. 2d 290, 294, 372 N.Y.S.2d 296, 302 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975). UPC § 2-803 as cited
in Gedlen v. Safran, 102 Wis. 2d 79, 89-90, 306 N.W.2d 27, 32 (1981). UPC § 2-803(e) as
cited in California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524, 532 (E.D.
La. 1981). UPC § 3-706 as cited in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Marshall, 16 Wash. App.
503, 510, 557 P.2d 352, 356 (1976). UPC §§ 3-801 to -804 as cited in Lunderville v.
Morse, 112 N.H. 6, 9, 287 A.2d 612, 614 (1972). UPC § 3-803 as cited in Belancsik v.
Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 116, 492 P.2d 219, 222 (1971). UPC §§ 3-
803(c)(1), -812, -814 as cited in Kornitz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d
322, 332 n.8, 260 N.W.2d 680, 685 n.8 (1978). UPC § 3-814 as cited in Caruthers v.
Buscher, 38 Md. App. 661, 671 n.9, 382 A.2d 608, 614 n.9 (1978). UPC § 5-408(3) as cited
in In re Morris, 111 N.H. 287, 289, 281 A.2d 156, 157 (1971). UPC §§ 6-103(a), -104(a) as
cited in Estate of Thompson v. Botts, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 371, 374-75, 423 N.E.2d 90, 94
(1981). UPC § 6-104 as cited in Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979). UPC § 6-201 comment as cited in Blanchette v. Blanchette, 362 Mass. 518, 526,
287 N.E.2d 459, 464 (1972). UPC § 7-103 as cited in Norton v. Bridges, 712 F.2d 1156,
1162 (7th Cir. 1983). UPC § 7-205 as cited in Mercer v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 112 N.H.
441, 444, 298 A.2d 736, 738 (1972). UPC § 7-302 as cited in In re Estate of Killey, 457 Pa.
474, 480 n.3, 326 A.2d 372, 376 n.3 (1974) (Roberts, J., concurring). UPC § 7-304 as cited
in Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1236 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983).
Courts in the following cases rejected specific UPC sections: Toman v. Svoboda, 39
Ill. App. 3d 394, 404 n.4, 349 N.E.2d 668, 677 n.4 (1976); Swearingen v. Giles, 565 S.W.2d
574, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 80-81 (Wyo. 1983).
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ment. The approach can often be quite straightforward: look up
the UPC position on point and cite it if it is favorable. The
Code's comprehensiveness makes it likely that the question is
addressed. Courts have noted that the Code was drafted by rec-
ognized experts and that it often either has been a part of a
modern trend or has adopted the "general" rule. A Texas court
put it this way: "[W]e are impressed with the fact that Sec. 2-
508 has been approved by the National Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1969.
48
Strikingly similar language appears in a Kansas opinion. 9
Another Texas court recognized that the Code was drafted by
"distinguished legal scholars. '50 A New Hampshire opinion cited
the UPC as evidence of a trend to disregard the traditional rule
that a lapsed residuary legacy passes by intestacy.5 1 Courts in
Tennessee 52 and Wisconsin5 3 have cited the Code with other sec-
48. Calloway v. Estate of Gasser, 558 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
49. Russell v. Estate of Russell, 216 Kan. 730, 733, 534 P.2d 261, 264 (1975) ("[W]e
are impressed by the fact that it [UPC § 2-508] was approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Association in
1969.").
50. Smith v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("[W]e recognize
that the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, who drafted the Uniform
Code, are distinguished legal scholars .... ").
51. In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H. 320, 324-25, 295 A.2d 448, 451 (1972). See also,
e.g., Rogers v. Helmes, 23 Ohio Op. 3d 301, 305 n.10, 432 N.E.2d 186, 190 n.10 (1982)
(modern trend to relax the rule of testimonial necessity); In re Morris, 111 N.H. 287, 298,
281 A.2d 156, 157 (1971) (modern trend to permit guardians to make gifts from the
estate of an incompetent); Thom v. Bailey, 257 Or. 572, 600 n.38, 481 P.2d 355, 368 n.38
(1971) (modern trend to grant illegitimate children inheritance rights equal to those of
legitimate children).
The New Hampshire court's willingness to rely on the UPC is striking. The Code
has been cited on widely varying points in six cases since 1971. See In re Estate of
Leavy, 122 N.H. 184, 185-86, 442 A.2d 588, 589 (1982) (citing UPC § 2-606(b), favoring
residuary legatees over intestate heirs); In re Rice, 118 N.H. 528, 531, 390 A.2d 1146,
1148 (1978) (citing UPC § 2-508, providing that a divorce coupled with a property settle-
ment operates as a revocation of specific testamentary provisions favoring the spouse and
not the entire will); Mercer v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 112 N.H. 441, 444, 298 A.2d 736,
738 (1972) (citing UPC § 7-205, providing that charge of reasonable termination fee does
not constitute impermissible reopening of prior accounts); In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H.
320, 324-25, 295 A.2d 448, 451 (1972) (citing UPC § 2-606(b), allowing the surviving
residual legatees to share the lapsed portion of the residue); Lunderville v. Morse, 112
N.H. 6, 9, 287 A.2d 612, 614 (1972) (citing UPC §§ 3-801 to -804, providing that ques-
tions of form and technical exactness must give way to substance and reality); In re
Morris, 111 N.H. 287, 289, 281 A.2d 156, 157 (1971) (citing UPC § 5-408(3), permitting
guardians to make gifts from the estate of an incompetent).
52. Warpool v. Floyd, 524 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tenn. 1975) (citing UPC § 2-107, which
gives half bloods "the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole blood").
53. Kornitz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 322, 332 n.8, 260
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ondary authority as evidence of the general rule in a particular
situation. The UPC has also served as a source of definitions.5
4
In some cases, the UPC has been used to support constitu-
tional law arguments. In Norton v. Bridges,s the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that Wisconsin could, consistent with
due process, assert jurisdiction over a trustee living in Illinois
because the trust had been registered in Wisconsin. Although
the UPC had not been adopted in Wisconsin, the court relied
upon it heavily by analogy. The court noted that "[t]he Code is
framed so as to permit an exercise of jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by the Constitution" 6 and quoted the UPC
comment that "[cilearly the trustee can be deemed to consent to
jurisdiction by virtue of registration." 57 Thus:
[the trustee's] acceptance of the trusteeship of a trust that the
settlor had registered in Wisconsin could be deemed, consistent
with the Uniform Probate Code, . . . [to be] consent to the
jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court. Because the constraints of
due process are recognized by the Code, this analogy suggests
that an assertion of jurisdiction by the Wisconsin court over
the . . . trust would be constitutional.5 8
A similar "if the UPC does it, it must be constitutional" argu-
ment was also advanced in a Washington opinion rejecting an
equal protection challenge to a statute that, like the UPC,59 sets
different statutes of limitations for estates with and estates
without liability insurance.6e Judicial respect for the drafters of
the Code leads to the strong presumption that its provisions
meet constitutional requirements."1 Advocates facing constitu-
N.W.2d 680, 685 n.8 (1978) (citing UPC §§ 3-803(c)(1), 3-812, 3-814 for the statement:
"A secured creditor retains his rights in any security in spite of failure to file.").
54. See Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 206 n.2, 223 S.E.2d 445, 451 n.2 (1976) ("inter-
ested person" includes "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any
others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a dece-
dent, ward or protected person which may be affected by the proceeding"); Taylor v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 325 N.E.2d 444, 446
(1975) (citing UPC § 1-201(4) for the proposition that a "claim" does not include a pro-
ceeding which places in issue decedent's title to specific assets).
55. 712 F.2d 1156, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 1162.
57. Id. (quoting UPC § 7-103 comment).
58. Id.
59. UNxp. PROS. CODE § 3-803, 8 U.L.A. 354 (1983).
60. Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 116, 492 P.2d 219, 222
(1971) (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 11.40.010).
61. See e.g., Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 206 nn.1-2, 223 S.E.2d 445, 451 nn.1-2
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tional law arguments have benefited from consulting the UPC.
As noted earlier, a few decisions have rejected the UPC
position. In the absence of clear authority on either side of the
question, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals declined to follow the
UPC rule that the lapsed portion of a residuary bequest goes to
the surviving residuary legatees.2 The court reached this result
despite earlier Texas decisions expressly following the UPC rules
about the effect of divorce on a will.8 3 Sometimes a legislature's
failure to adopt a UPC provision when undertaking probate
reform has been read by a court as disapproval of the UPC
approach. For example, in Toman v. Svoboda, 4 an Illinois
widow sought to invalidate inter vivos transfers made by her
husband. She argued that the UPC concept of an augmented
estate should be followed.65 The court acknowledged the UPC
recommendation but rejected it: "We are also aware, however,
that the Illinois General Assembly, in enacting the new Probate
Act of 1975 . ..did not see fit to include . .. Section 2-202
... ,,6" In Wyoming, the court declined to follow the UPC rule
regarding the enforceability of no-contest clauses.17 The court
reasoned:
[W]e . . .find additional strength for our position from the
fact that our legislature has chosen not to incorporate § 3-905
of the Uniform Probate Code into the recently enacted Wyo-
(1976) (constitutionality of a statute allowing a final judgment before notification to
known or easily ascertainable "interested persons," as defined by UPC § 1-201(20)). See
also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(20), 8 U.L.A 32 (1983).
62. Swearingen v. Giles, 565 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) ("Texas courts
hold that the portion of a residuary bequest which lapses without words of survivorship
passes by intestacy to the testatrix's heirs at law."); See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606, 8
U.L.A. 146 (1983).
63. See Calloway v. Estate of Gasser, 558 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(property not passing to the former spouse because of divorce passes as if the former
spouse predeceased the decedent, as in UPC § 2-508); Smith v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d 152,
155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (legislative intent in accord with UPC § 2-508). See supra text
accompanying notes 35-37. See also Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) (citing with approval UPC § 6-104(a) as support for following the majority
rule).
64. 39 Ill. App. 3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1976).
65. Id. at 403-04, 349 N.E.2d at 677. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75
(1983).
66. Toman, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 404 n.4, 349 N.E.2d at 677 n.4. But see Taylor v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Il1. App. 3d 610, 612, 325 N.E.2d 444, 446
(1975) (treating the UPC definition of "claim" as if it were in the Illinois statute).
67. Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 82 (Wyo. 1983) (although decedent's sister may
have contested decedent's will with probable cause and in good faith, court forfeits sis-
ter's $20,000 bequest pursuant to a no-contest clause).
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ming Probate Code .... The Wyoming legislature and the
committee that helped draft the new probate code were no
doubt aware of the Uniform Probate Code and all of its various
provisions ...."
The courts did not rely on explicit rejection of the UPC provi-
sion in either Illinois or Wyoming; rather, mere nonadoption of
the UPC in the face of the opportunity to adopt was read as
rejection 9 Because the UPC has been available to legislatures
for several years and because many decisions have looked favor-
ably upon a UPC rule in the absence of legislation, it is fair to
say that the general nonadoption argument has only rarely
worked. As the following part of this Article indicates, however,
legislative intent arguments often can be quite specific. Further-
more, when the legislative body has expressly rejected a UPC-
based proposal in favor of retaining the common-law rule, one
court has properly declined to follow the UPC.
7 °
In jurisdictions that have not adopted the UPC, the Code
has, nonetheless, played a role in shaping the law. Courts have
been willing to consider the UPC approach as persuasive author-
ity on a wide variety of points. However, the UPC almost cer-
tainly has been underused for this purpose. The Code's vast
potential for law reform through the courts may yet be realized,
as advocates become more aware that courts are willing to con-
sider favorably arguments based on the UPC.
2. The UPC as an Aid in Interpreting Legislation
The Code can be useful in interpreting local legislation in
jurisdictions that have not adopted the UPC but that have con-
sidered some of its provisions. Many of the courts adopting the
UPC rule did so in the context of local legislation that, because
of incompleteness, did not answer the question at hand I.7 The
focus of this part of the Article is upon judicial construction of
local statutes when the legislature had considered, or even
adopted, some UPC sections.
68. Id.
69. See also Estate of Liles, 435 A.2d 379, 383 (D.C. 1981); Green v. Potter, 51
N.Y.2d 627, 630-31, 416 N.E.2d 1030, 1032, 435 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (1980) (both courts
noted legislative rejection of the UPC alternative).
70. Estate of Liles, 435 A.2d 379, 383 (D.C. 1981) (court rejected UPC § 2-508 inter-
pretation of relevant law, noting that the city council had considered but not adopted
that section).
71. See supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
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Usually, the Code's role in this context is to help define
what the local legislation does not mean. The interpretation
question has arisen when several related sections on a topic have
been adopted from the UPC but a particular provision has not,
and when the UPC language has been changed. In three Oregon
cases,72 legislative decisions to omit sections or language were
read, appropriately, as rejections of the UPC rules proffered as
arguments. The New York Court of Appeals took a similar
approach in interpreting the New York Mental Hygiene Law as
not allowing attorneys' fees to the petitioner's attorney in a con-
servatorship proceeding.73 A different result was reached in Mas-
sachusetts, where the status of prior case law proved decisive. 7,
The UPC specifically denies to a conservator the power to make
a will for his or her ward. 7 Though said to be "drawn from" the
UPC, a new Massachusetts statute did not cover the question.7"
The failure to follow the UPC's approach of prohibiting will-
making by conservators might have been read as allowing such
power to the conservator. Instead, the court relied on prior case
law, which had interpreted an earlier statute (also without lan-
guage on the point) as not allowing such power.77 Despite the
differences between the local statute and the UPC, interpreta-
tions of the prior statute supporting an interpretation consistent
with the UPC were held unimpaired by the statutory revisions
72. Estate of Hendrickson v. Warburton, 276 Or. 989, 994-95, 557 P.2d 224, 227-28
(1976) (IT]he drafters of the Code intentionally omitted provisions of the then-pro-
posed Uniform Probate Code which would have conferred such powers upon the personal
representatives of decedents' estates."); Estate of Birch v. Oregon State Bar, 54 Or. App.
151, 154, 634 P.2d 284, 285 (1981) (court found that OR. REv. STAT. § 126.377 was taken
from the UPC, but that the legislature had deliberately deleted the words "existing" and
"prior," thus changing the meaning of the section); Estate of Phillips v. Phillips, 23 Or.
App. 363, 367 n.1, 542 P.2d 928, 930 n.1 (1975) ("Uniform Probate Code § 3-911 gives the
probate court jurisdiction to partition property in which it is distributing undivided
interests to heirs or devisees, but in adopting its new probate code in 1969, Oregon omit-
ted that provision."). See also Estate of Murphy v. Murphy, 92 Cal. App. 3d 413, 425,
154 Cal. Rptr. 859, 867 (1979) ("[Olur legislature ... explicitly omitted UPC section 2-
508. Thus, the . . . legislative intent was to maintain the existing case law .... ").
73. Green v. Potter, 51 N.Y.2d 627, 630-31, 416 N.E.2d 1030, 1032, 435 N.Y.S.2d
695, 697 (1980). But see In re Estate of Mixter, 83 Misc. 2d 290, 294, 372 N.Y.S.2d 296,
302 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975) (partial reliance on UPC § 2-801 despite the different approach
of a New York statute).
74. See In re Jones, 379 Mass. 826, 833-34, 401 N.E.2d 351, 356-57 (1980).
75. Id. at 833, 401 N.E.2d at 357.
76. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-407(3), 8 U.L.A. 485 (1983).
77. In re Jones, 379 Mass. 826, 833-34, 401 N.E.2d 351, 356-57 (1980) (citing Shange
v. Powers, 358 Mass. 126, 260 N.E.2d 704 (1970)).
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differing from the UPC.78 When a legislature has used the UPC
as a model, but made some changes, particular attention must
be paid to committee reports, to the language changes them-
selves, and to the state of the case law at the time of the change.
The UPC has been used effectively by courts seeking solu-
tions to both common-law and statutory construction problems.
Judicial support for particular UPC sections should commend
them to legislatures. Further, advocates ought to consider the
UPC both as another well-respected source of general authority
and as a guide to the meaning of particular provisions drawn
from the Code. As a way of illustrating how the UPC might be
used in a particular state, the next section briefly examines how
legislators and advocates in Washington might benefit from con-
sulting the Code.
IV. USES OF THE UPC IN WASHINGTON
The first parts of this Article have suggested that legisla-
tures, courts, and advocates could benefit from more frequent
reference to the UPC. This part briefly illustrates, by way of
example, appropriate targets for reform in one
state-Washington. The discussion is not intended as a compre-
hensive analysis of Washington law. Rather, it takes an
approach that might be effectively adopted in other jurisdictions
as well; it compares some of the most widely adopted UPC sec-
tions to current local law. The result in Washington is no doubt
typical of what could be found throughout the country: problem-
specific reference to the UPC could be useful to the legislature
and to advocates preparing for litigation. After identifying some
appropriate targets for statutory reform, this part illustrates
how the UPC might be used by litigators in Washington.
A. Potential for Piecemeal Reform
The frequency with which other non-UPC states have con-
sulted article II suggests that one fruitful way of identifying
areas ripe for reform is to compare the most popular UPC sec-
tions to the local statute.79 A selective review of the Revised
Code of Washington reveals several areas in which the law could
be clarified or simplified by adopting the UPC approach. To
78. Id. at 832-33, 401 N.E.2d at 357.
79. See supra Table I, pp. 604-05.
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illustrate how piecemeal reform could improve Washington law,
this part examines four common sources of litigation: contracts
regarding wills, advancements, the effect of divorce on a will,
and common-disaster deaths.
One common source of litigation is a claim by a disap-
pointed relative that a decedent either promised to make a will
in favor of the relative"0 or promised not to revoke a will already
made.81 Because such agreements may be enforceable even
though they are oral8 2 and because a contract not to revoke is
sometimes implied from a joint will," such claims are relatively
easy to make for the purpose of bargaining with the favored
beneficiaries. In order to reduce the availability of such "strike
suits," the UPC requires some written evidence of the contract.8 4
The UPC approach is preferable to that currently followed in
Washington since the UPC clearly allows contracts to be made
regarding wills but precludes claims of agreements when the tes-
tator left no written evidence of any such intention. 8
A similar problem arises in the context of advancements,
and the UPC has adopted a similar solution. In Washington, an
inter vivos gift to someone who becomes an intestate heir may
be found to have been an advancement against the donee's share
of the estate.8 " The problem is determining just when a transfer
80. See Thompson v. Henderson, 22 Wash. App. 373, 591 P.2d 784 (1979) (son did
not establish as highly probable that father had orally agreed to devise entire estate to
son).
81. See Arnold v. Beckman, 74 Wash. 2d 836, 447 P.2d 184 (1968) (testimony of
drafter of wills insufficient to establish that couple agreed to make mutual wills); Auger
v. Shideler, 23 Wash. 2d 505, 161 P.2d 200 (1945) (testimony of drafter and others suffi-
cient to establish mutual nature of wills).
82. See Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 2 Wash. 2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940)
(oral contract to devise and bequeath real and personal property entitled to specific per-
formance when terms of contract can be established with reasonable certainty).
83. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 222-27 (2d ed. 1953).
84. UPC § 2-701 provides that such a contract "can be established only by (1) provi-
sions of a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an express reference in a
will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writ-
ing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-701, 8 U.L.A.
155 (1983).
85. See Arnold v. Beckman, 74 Wash. 2d 836, 840, 447 P.2d 184, 186 (1968). "It now
appears clear and obvious that. . some suitable mention of the testator's agreement in
the wills or some independent writing containing it, would have eliminated our present
problem [of determining whether there was an agreement]." Id. at 839, 447 P.2d at 186.
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.041 (1983) provides:
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in his
lifetime as an advancement to any person who, if the intestate had died at the
time of making the advancement, would be entitled to inherit a part of his
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is intended as an absolute gift and when it is intended as an
advancement."7 In order to minimize the opportunity for other
beneficiaries to reduce unfairly the share of someone who
received inter vivos gifts, the UPC treats such transfers as
advancements "only if declared in a contemporaneous writing by
the decedent or acknowledged in writing by the heir to be an
advancement." 88 This approach allows persons to make advance-
ments, but avoids the murky questions that now must be asked
about a donor's intention at the time of an inter vivos transfer.
Another troublesome area has been the effect of divorce on
a will benefiting a spouse.8" The Washington statute follows a
common approach: "A divorce, subsequent to the making of a
will, shall revoke the will as to the divorced spouse.""0 Unan-
swered by the statute are the questions whether the remainder
of the will is interpreted as if the spouse predeceased the dece-
dent and whether a remarriage to the former spouse will "undo"
the revocation provided by the statute. Because UPC section 2-
508 answers these common questions affirmatively, 9 its adop-
tion would serve to clarify another area of Washington law.
The UPC's improvement upon the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act 92 (USDA) provides a final illustration of how piece-
meal adoption of UPC provisions could be beneficial in Wash-
ington. The USDA, adopted in Washington, 3 determines how
property will pass when "there is no sufficient evidence that per-
sons have died otherwise than simultaneously." 9' The statute
was designed to answer the "Now what?" question that could
result in the context of a "common disaster." However, sufficient
estate, shall be counted toward the advancee's intestate share, and to the
extent that it does not exceed such intestate share shall be taken into account
in computing the estate to be distributed.
87. Compare Holt v. Schweinler, 71 Wash. 2d 820, 825, 430 P.2d 965, 968 (1967)
(authorization by father for daughter to withdraw money from bank account constituted
an advancement) with Girault v. Hotaling Co., 7 Wash. 90, 93, 34 P. 471, 472 (1893)
(money furnished to son-in-law to purchase land and construct building not an
advancement).
88. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-110, 8 U.L.A. 69 (1983). See also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-612,
8 U.L.A. 153 (1983) (ademption by satisfaction).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.050 (1983).
91. Under the UPC, the will is interpreted as if the former spouse had failed to
survive the decedent and as if provisions revoked by the section are "revived by testa-
tor's remarriage to the former spouse." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-508, 8 U.L.A. 122 (1983).
92. UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 8A U.L.A. 557-89 (1983).
93. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.05.010-.040 (1983).
94. Id. § 11.05.010.
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evidence that one person survived the other, even if only for an
instant,95 precludes application of the statute.9 6 In order to avoid
the multiple probates and disruptions to estate plans that can
result when a beneficiary survives a decedent for just a short
time, the UPC effectively defines "survival" as survival by 120
hours. 7 The UPC's 120-hour rule is a sensible reform proposal;
it both supports the policies of the current USDA and corrects
inadequacies in that act.
Adoption of various UPC provisions in Washington need
not involve sweeping changes in the law. The Code can serve as
a model for piecemeal reform. Washington, like most states,
could benefit from a careful review of the UPC with an eye to
updating and clarifying particularly common problem areas.
B. A Source for Washington Advocates
Part III of this Article demonstrated how the UPC has been
used by courts and advocates as persuasive secondary authority
for adopting a "modern" rule. Such use is open, of course, to any
Washington attorney.98 In addition, the UPC could prove valua-
ble in situations in which the UPC approach and that of Wash-
ington are similar. This part of the Article discusses, again by
way of illustration,"9 two areas in which consulting the UPC
could be valuable to a Washington advocate: problems involving
savings accounts and a new Washington provision permitting a
will to transfer personal property identified in a separate
unattested writing.
95. See Norton v. Bonnell, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 331, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139, 143 (1967)
(one person survived the other by 1/150,000th of a second).
96. Id. at 333, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
97. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-104, 8 U.L.A. 64 (1983); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-601, 8
U.L.A. 128 (1983).
98. As noted earlier, one Washington opinion has cited the UPC's adoption of differ-
ent statutes of limitation for estates with and estates without liability insurance as sup-
port for the proposition that Washington's similar treatment is constitutional. See
Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash. 2d 111, 116, 492 P.2d 219, 222 (1971);
see supra text accompanying note 60.
A similar argument might have been made in In re Estate of Young, 23 Wash. App.
761, 598 P.2d 7 (1979). In that case, potential will contestants challenged the adequacy of
notice of a pending probate on due process grounds because the notice did not specify
when and how a will contest might be initiated. In rejecting the challenge, the court
might have cited UPC provisions that, like the Washington statute, make no require-
ment of such specificity. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 1-401, 3-306(b), 3-402, 3-403, 8 U.L.A.
47, 251, 272, 274 (1983).
99. For citation to other Washington law influenced by the UPC, see Tables I and
II, supra pp. 604-07.
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Questions regarding ownership rights to savings accounts
both during the lifetimes of the depositors and after the death of
one depositor have plagued the courts for years. 00 Since 1982
Washington has had a statute designed to reduce the confusion
in this area and to allow a variety of accounts that effectively
avoid probate by transferring ownership at the death of one
depositor. 1 1 UPC article VI, part I provides a substantially simi-
lar scheme to that in place in Washington.10 2 The similarity in
policy and approach between the UPC and the Washington stat-
ute should allow Washington judges and lawyers to consult the
UPC and, in particular, its comments for help in interpreting
the Washington statute.
Another problem arises when a will refers to lists of tangible
personal property, usually to be written some time after the will
is executed, that are intended to designate who should receive
particular items. Because such lists were not in existence at the
time of the will's execution, the doctrine of incorporation by ref-
erence will generally not apply to save them. 03 The lists are
clearly for a testamentary purpose, and the doctrine of facts of
nontestamentary significance will not apply. 10" Holding the view
that a list of who takes the china cabinet and who takes the
cedar chest is likely to reflect the testator's intent despite the
lack of testamentary formalities, the drafters of the UPC gave
effect to such lists in some circumstances. 0 5 In 1984 Washington
adopted a similar, but more detailed and more restrictive, provi-
sion. 10 6 As lawyers and judges grapple with the meaning of the
new section, they can look to the UPC provision and its com-
ment for guidance.
Because in recent years both the Washington Supreme
Court and the Washington Legislature have looked to the Uni-
form Probate Code as a model, Washington lawyers should be
100. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41. For a recent typical Washington
case, see In re Estate of Oney, 31 Wash. App. 325, 641 P.2d 725 (1982).
101. See WASH. REv. CODE § 30.22.100 (1983). The statutory scheme specifically
affects six types of accounts: "(1) [a] single account; (2) [a] joint account without right of
survivorship; (3) [a] joint account with right of survivorship; (4) [ain agency account; (5)
[a] trust or P.O.D. account; and (6) [a]ny compatible combination of the foregoing." Id. §
30.22.050.
102. See UNi. PROS. CODE §§ 6-101 to -113, 8 U.L.A. 520-33 (1983).
103. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 83, at 390-91.
104. See id. at 394-400.
105. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-513 & comment, 8 U.L.A. 126 (1983).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.260 (Supp. 1984).
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aware of the potential for using the Code as a source of argu-
ment. One of the advantages of referring to the UPC is that it
provides three sources in one: the language of the Code itself,
the drafters' comments, and decisions in other jurisdictions
interpreting the particular provision in question. Such a rich
source of information ought not to be ignored.
The final part of this Article has demonstrated, through
selected Washington examples, the potential of the UPC as a
source of law reform and of legal argument. In part because of
the evidence that other jurisdictions have profited from such use
of the Code, its utility as a source for conscientious judges, law-
yers, and legislators will likely increase.
V. CONCLUSION
The breadth of its scope, the quality of its drafting, and the
reputations of its framers have given the Uniform Probate Code
significant influence over the development of the law in non-
UPC states. It has served as the model for numerous provisions
on a wide variety of topics. Courts have used it both as a
respected secondary authority and as an aid to statutory con-
struction. Nonetheless, the Code's vast potential has been
largely unrealized in Washington and elsewhere. Reformers
seeking statutory solutions to particular problems should consult
the UPC, buoyed by the knowledge that legislative unwillingness
to adopt the Code as a whole usually has not been read as rejec-
tion of any specific proposal. Lawyers and judges should turn
with confidence to the UPC for guidance. 107
107. Professor J. Rodney Johnson of the University of Richmond has suggested to
the writer that many lawyers may be using the UPC as a model for drafting. Since large
numbers of wills problems can be avoided with proper drafting, lawyers would be well
advised to review the UPC when they revise their forms. Particularly relevant are those
sections of article II that cover traditional troublespots and that have attracted favorable
legislative and judicial attention.
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